now standard school. His approach is not without controversy. Some may object to taking seriously Know Nothing politicos' pretensions to social and labor reform. Purists may likewise regret his rather anachronistic portrayal of the Know Nothing political style as "populist." Presentism may also be evident in the extended Ventura analogy. Nonetheless, Voss-Hubbard's meticulous attention to the Know Nothings' local roots and antiparty spirit offers intriguing insights on preCivil War political developments. What emerges is a picture of a discriminating, confident, often daring mind committed to offensive operations and not overly concerned with the enemy's own plans-a recipe for military success. Grant possessed coup d'oeil, the ability to make sound decisions in the midst of chaos and to make sense out of uncertainty. Unlike some of his counterparts, who disdained the "secret service," Grant actively pursued intelligence and supported its gatherers faithfully During the Vicksburg campaign, he used Grenville Dodge's network of scouts and spies to discover Corifederate whereabouts and intentions. (Housed at the State Historical Society of Iowa, Dodge's papers provide ample opportunity for historians wishing to follow Feis's lead.) Facing Lee in the East, a more difficult task. Grant looked to the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (BMI), created in 1863. The first official intelligence apparatiis in the U.S. Army, the BMI provided key information-gleaned from Richmond spy rings, newspapers, and scouts-which Grant used to defeat Lee.
A lack of information could make a command inert and vulnerable, as in George McCleUan's case. Grant realized early on that all generals, including the enemy, face this düemma, but instead of endlessly waiting for perfect intelligence, he boldly took the initiative. He made mistakes. At Shiloh, according to Feis, it was Grant's belief that the Confederates were unable and unwilling to attack that led to the disastrous first day, not an intelligence failure. More important was Grant and the BMI's faüure to discover and prevent Jubal Early's Shenandoah Valley raid in the summer of 1864. Feis argues that such miscues were often the result of general human faüings such as the misperception and wishful thinking that afflict all judgments. More than mere exculpation, Feis ülustrates the difficulties of generalship while demonsti'ating how Grant the man both persevered and excelled.
Feis's pioneering approach sheds light on Grant but precludes much contextual analysis. In other words. Grant is somewhat in a vacuum here. One hopes that Feis will undertake a scrutiny of the inteUigence used by other Civil War generals-especially Robert E. Lee -for comparison. But with this portrait Feis challenges the view of Grant as the butcher of Cold Harbor winning only with superior numbers. The lens of intelligence shows Grant as a complex flgure calculating with inteUect and instinct. Despite Sherman's statement to the contrary. Grant really did "Care a Damn for What the Enemy Does Out of His Sight," to devastating effect (267). 
Struggle for the

